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MASS TORTS AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The technologies of the present era mean that injuries have 
become more massive in dimension.  Mass torts affect greater 
numbers of people and larger geographical areas.  Consequently, 
they can cross borders, affecting the populations of multiple 
countries.1  Mass catastrophes need not involve intentional 
wrongdoing, of course.  The devastating 1986 accident at the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, for example, resulted from a 
design failure combined with inadequately trained personnel. 
United States law has two mechanisms in tort law for 
remedying mass catastrophes.  The first, applicable to 
unintentional as well as intentional torts, is the class action lawsuit, 
which has no functional equivalent in the civil law nations of 
Continental Europe.  The unintentional tort is not the subject of 
this essay.  The second, restricted to cases involving jus cogens 
violations (namely, violations of human rights so grave as to be 
against international customary law, or the “law of nations”), is 
universal jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  
Universal jurisdiction for jus cogens violations does have a 
functional equivalent in civil law States, but not in their tort law.2 
Traditionally, civil law legal systems have restricted universal 
jurisdiction to criminal actions.  This distinction generally has been 
viewed as a seminal difference between the United States and the 
 
 Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. 
1 For a list of countries affected by the Chernobyl disaster, see In Focus: Cher-
nobyl, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ fo-
cus/chernobyl/faqs.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (discussing the impact of the 
disaster on Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Russia, Belarus, and other coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union).  
2 Until the recent Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), federal appellate courts had been applying the ATS ex-
traterritorially since 1980.  The statute, enacted in 1789 but rarely applied, was re-
vived in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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rest of the world, a view shared both by common law and civil law 
jurists.  It should be noted that few countries in the world have the 
common law system, as it has been ‘exported’ from Great Britain 
only to regions that had once been part of the former British 
Empire.  Antonio Cassese has praised the ATS for filling the gap 
for individuals where neither an international entity nor the 
territorial State would have afforded a forum,3 but expresses the 
concern that the civil—as opposed to criminal—law nature of the 
ATS creates “the danger for courts of [the United States] of setting 
themselves up as universal judges of atrocities committed abroad, 
a sort of humanitarian imperialism.”4  Similarly, in Kiobel, the 
Second Circuit articulated the goal of avoiding legal imperialism as 
a reason for immunizing corporations from liability under the ATS.  
Such concerns were also expressed by several justices of the 
Supreme Court at both Kiobel oral arguments.5  
Though ATS opponents claim that international law does not 
recognize civil universal jurisdiction, international legal theory 
does not pose an obstacle to a State’s grant of civil jurisdiction for 
extraterritorial matters.  In his highly respected work, Ian Brownlie 
states that “in principle [there is] no great difference between the 
problems created by the assertion of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over aliens.”6  The Permanent Court of International Justice 
defined national prerogatives for extraterritorial jurisdiction 
broadly in the much-cited 1927 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) case.7  
Although the significance of the broad language in Lotus is a 
matter of  dispute, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has never 
rejected Lotus, although the 1970 Barcelona Traction decision8 
qualified Lotus by calling to mind that limits exist and that a State 
 
3 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (2d ed. 2005) (noting the 
“great significance of these US court decisions”). 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
2013 WL 1628935 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://www. su-
premecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf; Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf. 
6 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (7th ed., 2008). 
7 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
10, ¶ 46 (Sept. 7). 
8 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 
1970 I.C.J. 64, ¶3 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice). 
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has “an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the 
extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a 
foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a 
jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately 
exercisable by another State.”9 
The ATS itself states only that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations.”10  In his concurring 
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,11 Justice Breyer analyzed the 
ATS’s reach as the intersection of several factors when he reasoned 
that “international law will sometimes . . . reflect not only 
substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned 
behavior but also procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction 
exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior”12 and that such 
“subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes.”13 
Despite the distinctive official restriction of universal 
jurisdiction to the criminal law domain in civilian nations, 
universal and extraterritorial ATS civil jurisdiction is not 
significantly distinctive from the criminal-law universal and 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that has become part of international 
customary law for jus cogens violations.  This functional 
equivalence has been obscured because the identical official 
categories of criminal and non-criminal law exist in both legal 
orders, such that there is a natural, automatic tendency to assume 
in both common law and civil law States that both systems 
categorize the ‘criminal’ and the ‘civil’ in fundamentally the same 
way.  In fact, as discussed below, the most substantively significant 
aspects of the civilian criminal trial are reproduced by the U.S. tort 
trial, and vice versa.  Thus, ATS universal jurisdiction would place 
the United States within the community of nations; it would not 
isolate the United States from that community, and the 
extraterritorial effects of the statute similarly would be akin to 
those of criminal law universal jurisdiction in civilian nations. 
 
9 Id. at 105 ¶ 70. 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
11 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 762 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. a (1986)). 
13 Id. (citing INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES 2 (2000)). 
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2. KNOCKING AT THE CIVILIAN DOOR 
For some time, the peculiarities of modern mass catastrophes 
and increased transnational jurisdictional fluidity have brought the 
American class action tort suit and the ATS increasing attention 
and interest in Continental Europe.  Already in 1994, a French 
scholar proposed that the modern mass tort called for legal 
categorization that did not yet exist.  He proposed a “grand-scale 
tort” (un délit à grande échelle).14  Calais-Aulois would like a mass 
compensation mechanism that does not require proof of criminal 
intent, and where the law’s focus is brought to bear on the result, 
rather than the act. 15 
The American class action tort suit became familiar to 
Continental European lawyers and scholars with the Holocaust-
related cases brought in U.S. courts starting in the mid-1990s. 
These cases involved current or former nationals or residents of 
their own countries and sought multi-million dollar compensation 
from their institutions and companies for misdeeds taken in 
complicity with Nazi Germany.  In 2006, in the Lipietz case, a 
French lawyer who was precluded from pursuing a criminal 
action16 brought an action in tort law against the French 
government and the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fers, the 
national railway company, for actions taken by both entities 
against his clients, two cousins who had been persecuted under the 
anti-Semitic laws of the Vichy régime (1940–1944).  The underlying 
acts were grave crimes against humanity.  The lower court, to the 
surprise of many, found for the plaintiffs, in what remains a 
 
14 See Jean Calais-Auloy, Les délits à grande échelle en droit civil français, 46 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 379, 380 (1994) (setting forth a new 
form of tort characterized not by the state of mind of the actor, but by the enormi-
ty of the damage done). In a similar vein, see Claude Lienhard, Pour un droit des 
catastrophes, chron., LE DALLOZ 91 (1995). 
15 Calais-Auloy, supra note 14, at 386. 
16 The reasons were somewhat complex, and had to do with the state the 
French law when the suit originally was brought.  The larger procedural context 
of the case, which involved acts from over half a century in the past, concerned a 
legal impossibility of damages for victims such as the plaintiffs until the French 
courts reversed themselves on the issue in recent cases, the most famous of which 
was Papon.  For a more detailed account of this case, see Tribunal administratif 
[TA] [administrative tribunal] Toulouse, 2e ch., June 6, 2006, No. 0104248 (Fr.), 
available at http://lipietz.net/IMG/pdf/TaToulouseJugementLipietz.pdf. An 
English translation by Anne Witt, as revised by Vivian Grosswald Curran, is 
available at The Lipietz Judgment in English, ACACCIA (July 6, 2006), http:// 
www.acaccia.fr/The-Judgment-Lipietz-in-English.html. 
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landmark case inasmuch as the French government did not appeal 
the verdict.  The appellate court reversed, however.  It said the case 
should have been brought in criminal court, a ruling affirmed by 
the Supreme Court (Conseil d’État). 
In recent years, both Italy and Greece have allowed civil 
proceedings and damages to be awarded against Germany for jus 
cogens violations:  massacres, torture and the like.  Though, those 
judgments proved unenforceable.  The Brussels I Convention that 
makes all judgments in civil and commercial matters applicable 
automatically throughout the European Union was held by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be inapplicable.17  In accordance 
with the reasoning of the German courts which had refused 
enforcement, the ECJ reasoned that the underlying issues were not 
of a civil nature, the judgments indeed having been based on jus 
cogens violations, and, therefore, that Brussels I did not apply.  In 
March 2012, just days after the first (February 28, 2012) Supreme 
Court oral argument in Kiobel, however, a Dutch court granted civil 
damages to a Palestinian doctor for torture and imprisonment 
endured in Libya under the Qaddafi régime in connection with the 
Bulgarian nurses’ affair.18  On October 11, 2012, another Dutch 
court decided that it had jurisdiction over Shell in a suit brought by 
Nigerians for polluting the Niger Delta.19 
Such suits show the force of transnational legal communication 
and the transnationalization of injuries.  Traditional legal 
categories in the systems of Continental Europe, derived from 
Roman law, do not, however, include the tort action where crimes 
warranting universal jurisdiction are at issue. 
 
17 See Case C-292/05, Lechitrou v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 2007 E.C.R. I-1540.   
18 Rb. Gravenhage [Court of First Instance of The Hague] 21 maart 2012 [Mar. 
21, 2012], m nt. Van der Helm 400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.). 
19 See Denis Burke, Verdict Due in Case Against Shell, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH 
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 21, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.foei.org/en/what-we-
do/climate-and-energy/latest-news/verdict-due-in-case-against-shell.  See also 
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3. ATS UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:  UNIVERSAL OR SINGULAR? 
3.1.  The Tort Action in the Civil Law World:  A Private Affair 
It should perhaps have been clear at the outset from the first 
Kiobel oral argument that corporate liability under the ATS was not 
going to be the issue of interest to the Supreme Court, although it 
was the sole issue to have been appealed to the Court.  Before the 
plaintiffs’ attorney had finished his first sentence, Justice Kennedy 
interrupted to state that, for him, the case turned on whether the 
United States was alone in having universal jurisdiction in civil 
cases.  Other justices echoed his concern.  Justice Roberts asked 
whether it would not in and of itself be a violation of international 
law to be the only country to grant civil universal jurisdiction for 
crimes against humanity. 
The isolation of the United States in this respect, other than for 
a few very recent cases in the Netherlands,20 seems to be taken for 
granted.  One typically sees in international law books and 
treatises the categorizations of criminal and civil law used to 
delineate the actions for jus cogens violations that can be subject to 
universal jurisdiction.  The United States is then named alone for 
its civil universal jurisdiction.  In terms of ATS viability, however, 
it is germane to see that the reasons civilians reject universal civil 
jurisdiction do not apply to the United States legal system.  This is 
because United States tort law is functionally more equivalent to 
civilian criminal law than to civilian tort law.  To the question of 
whether the United States is alone, the answer is that it is not 
because the civil/criminal categorizations are misleading. 
The traditional civilian legal system rejects the tort action for 
universal jus cogens suits with good reason.  Civilian tort suits are 
often entirely in writing, with no live testimony.  The concept of 
the trial as formed in the common law system is sufficiently 
different from the civilian tort action that the word trial perhaps 
should be avoided when referring to the civilian tort action.  If one 
looks at the word used in a number of the original languages, it is 
the word with the same etymology as the English word for 
 
20 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying texts.  In the most recent case, four 
Nigerians sued Dutch Shell in the Netherlands for pollution damages caused by 
its Nigerian subsidiary.  It was the first time a Dutch court had entertained such a 
suit against a multinational parent company, but in January, 2013, the court dis-
missed charges against all but the subsidiary.   
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‘process’:  in German Prozeß, in French procès, in Italian processo.  
The concept indeed denotes a process, a series of events, with no 
concentrated oral event as its focal point.  The civil trial never has a 
jury in the civilian system.  It is private.  Nothing is in the public 
domain.  In some countries like France, the lawyers’ submissions to 
court are their own private intellectual property.  While in some 
countries, a computerized system makes all court decisions 
available (although the manner in which the legal system functions 
is such that meaningful understanding of any court decision 
requires its interpretation by influential scholars), in other 
countries, lower court decisions are unpublished and unavailable 
even to the legal community at large.  One has to request 
permission of the court to read them, which may or may not be 
granted, at the court’s discretion. 
Contingency fee arrangements of the United States sort are 
deemed unethical in the civil law legal orders of Continental 
Europe.  In addition to national statutes barring these 
arrangements, the Code of Conduct of the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe does so as well.21  Class actions are not 
permitted as they are seen as violating the principle that law must 
in every case be individual.  In Lipietz, the French case mentioned 
above in which the lower court ruled in favor of two cousins who 
had sued for wartime atrocities committed against them, after the 
lower court’s decision, this principle meant that thousands of 
individual plaintiffs brought similar suits, flooding the system.  
There was no procedure for bringing all of the suits of the similarly 
situated plaintiffs to be adjudicated together.  Each plaintiff had to 
hire a lawyer, none on a contingency fee basis.  The appellate court 
decisions ended those suits.  Affirming the appellate court, the 
Supreme Court found that a political resolution already existed for 
these cases, referring to a French compensation commission that 
had been established in conjunction with a bilateral treaty 
negotiated with the United States.  Where no political solution has 
been found, other resolutions sometimes have been fashioned.  In 
some cases of mass catastrophes, the government has undertaken 
 
21 See COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
EUROPEAN LAWYERS, art. 3.3 (2006) (“A lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pac-
tum de quota litis.”) available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_ up-
load/NTCdocument/EN_Code_of_conductp1_1306748215.pdf.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
06_CURRAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:28 PM 
806 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
to compensate thousands of victims, with subsequent subrogation 
rights to sue the wrongdoers in the victims’ stead.22 
Without the possibility of contingency fee arrangements or 
class actions, it is much harder to gain access to the civil courts.  
Such a situation would be intolerable in cases of heinous crimes, 
such as jus cogens violations.  In addition, the lawyer in Continental 
European civilian systems is more passive than in the United States 
system.  There is no equivalent to discovery.  It is the judge who is 
responsible for developing evidence.  By contrast, in the United 
States, the lawyer who brings the tort action on a contingency fee 
basis may be motivated by the very public debate that could not 
exist for a civil suit in Continental Europe.  The plaintiffs would be 
entitled to a jury and newspapers would be reporting on the events 
that transpired each day at the concentrated oral event that is the 
pivotal element of the U.S. tort trial.  Where, as in ATS cases, the 
allegations concerned grave crimes against humanity or other 
matters of great public interest, media attention would be intense.  
The public would become a participant in a societal discourse 
about the case. 
3.2.  The Criminal Action in the Civil Law World:  Functionally 
Equivalent to the American Tort Action 
Giving victims access to the court system, allowing them to 
pursue financial compensation, and entering the public debate are 
functions that the civilian criminal trial accomplishes.  Like the tort 
trial in the United States, criminal trials in civil law systems have a 
concentrated oral phase that is covered by the media extensively 
when issues of public interest are at stake.  Criminal trials thus 
enter the public discourse and debate of society.  Unlike in the 
United States, victims typically can become part of the criminal 
trial in civil law legal systems.  The most frequent method for 
victims to join the criminal trial is as a civil party to the trial, a 
partie civile.  The victim becomes a participant, able to testify and to 
question the defendant.  It is a role that victims’ rights movement 
groups have tried to achieve for trials in the United States, but 
 
22 This was the case, among others, when HIV-contaminated blood was dis-
seminated by a central authority to hospitals, and then to patients, creating many 
thousands of victims in France.  See Calais-Auloy, supra note 14, at 379 n.4 (citing 
works on this subject). 
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without success, as a result of United States due process concerns 
for defendants. 
The partie civile structure solves many of the problems for jus 
cogens crimes that would exist in civil law systems if they were to 
grant universal jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes in civil court 
without further systemic adaptations.  For one, parties civiles make 
use of the State’s resources in criminal trials, which means the vast 
powers of investigation of the prosecutor.  Since the tort trial does 
not have contingency fee arrangements, victims would be put to 
great personal expense in tort actions.  We have noted above that 
civilian lawyers are more passive than judges, in comparison to 
lawyers in the United States.  In some (but not all) civilian states, 
prosecutors are magistrates; thus, they are trained as judges, and 
they are adept at investigation. 
In civil law systems, the vast powers of the civilian prosecutor 
and the relatively more passive role of the lawyer are balanced by 
the prosecutor’s being a neutral, non-partisan figure, with the task 
of pursuing exculpatory evidence as much as inculpating evidence.  
Prosecutors are unelected civil servants whose professional 
advancement does not hinge on accumulating large numbers of 
convictions.  In some countries, like France, the prosecutor can 
appeal a conviction if he or she concludes, for example, that the 
court imposed a stiffer sentence on the defendant than was 
justified. 
Equally important in assessing the ATS in the context of the 
law of other nations is the twofold traditional theory in civil law 
states that victims can initiate prosecutions and that prosecutors do 
not have discretion to forgo prosecution if they determine a crime 
to have been committed.  This theory means that, like in the U.S. 
tort action, the victim will have effective access to the judicial 
system.  The rule against prosecutorial discretion tends to be 
relaxed in universal jurisdiction cases.  Belgium is an example of a 
country that introduced such discretion for universal jurisdiction 
matters, but it has a narrower meaning than the term as used in the 
United States. 
The criminal trial in civilian legal orders resembles the U.S. tort 
trial more than the civilian tort trial does.  The reasons for 
restricting universal jurisdiction to criminal actions in the civilian 
systems are attributable to aspects of their tort actions that do not 
exist in U.S. tort actions.  Conversely, U.S. criminal law would 
create some difficulties for typical victims in ATS suits inasmuch as 
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prosecutors may choose not to pursue such cases, given the 
uncertainties of winning. 
Each system’s universal jurisdiction laws seem best suited to 
the goals both legal orders share of permitting victims effective 
access to their judicial system and to ensuring a vigorous public 
debate about important social, political, and legal issues. 
4. THE SUPRANATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The shrinking world has been bringing us together, but not 
necessarily facilitating our reading each other accurately.  The 
European Union, however, has by now developed fora in which 
jurists from both common and civil law systems have been 
working together for decades, and have developed mutual 
understanding.  This does not mean, of course, that when 
European court decisions are interpreted in the various Member 
States that they are not renationalized, that common law aspects of 
a decision are not recivilianized in civil law states, and vice versa. 
It, therefore, may not be surprising that it was the European 
Union, unlike its individual Member States, which wrote an 
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Kiobel, supporting universal 
jurisdiction under the ATS.  It had no trouble understanding that 
the civil courts of the United States did not signify a violation of 
international law standards.  It specified two provisos.  The first 
was that ATS universal jurisdiction be limited to those criminal 
matters subject to universal jurisdiction under international law.23  
The Supreme Court already has required this limitation since Sosa, 
however, giving a highly restrictive scope to acts coming within 
the ATS’ purview.  In addition, the European Union would require 
plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies to the extent that this action is 
not futile.24 
 
23 Brief of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 13-23, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), available at http://www.sdshhlaw.com/pdfs/European%20Commission% 
20on%20Behalf%20of%20the%20European%20Union%20%28Revised%29.pdf. 
24 Brief of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 30-35, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), available at http://www.sdshhlaw.com/pdfs/European%20Commission% 
20on%20Behalf%20of%20the%20European%20Union%20%28Revised%29.pdf. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
It is a truism that the question posed can determine the answer 
that will be provided in response.  The Supreme Court took the 
unusual step of ordering a rehearing in Kiobel so that the issue of 
extraterritoriality could be briefed and argued in the second round.  
At both oral arguments it asked two questions.  One of those 
questions may be viewed as the wrong question and one as the 
right question to ask. 
As the above makes clear, the wrong question—or the question 
to unravel so as to avoid the pitfall of a misleading answer that 
falls into the trap of the question’s formulation—was whether the 
United States is alone in allowing universal civil jurisdiction for jus 
cogens crimes, since, properly analyzed, the “civil” of the United 
States substantively is analogous to the “criminal” of the civilian 
world in the matter of universal jurisdiction.  In the end, the 
Supreme Court majority decided to reject extraterritoriality for the 
ATS so as, among others reasons, to avoid what it believed would 
be the consequence, namely “mak[ing] the United States a uniquely 
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”25  
But underneath this question, the Court was asking the right 
question for every ATS case, most international law cases, and an 
increasing number of cases that United States lawyers and judges 
face and will be facing on a daily basis:  what is the law of other 
nations?  With respect to the ATS, we cannot understand 
customary international law, or the “law of nations,” without 
understanding foreign nations.  International law is hard to sever 
from the States that have formed it and from the legal orders of 




25 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668 (emphasis added). 
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